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ON FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE:
A REPLY TO TWO CRITICS
Ted A. Warfield

William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I
reply to their commentaries.

1.

In "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible" I
argued, as the title indicates, that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible.] Both William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have
commented on my article. 2 I offer the following in reply.

II. Reply to Professor Hasker.
One way to argu~ that two propositions are consistent is to argue that
both are true. An argument of this form for the conclusion that divine
essential omniscience and human freedom are compatible might look like
this.:
Argument One
PI. God exists and is essentially omniscient.
P2. Human beings are free agents.
CI. So, Divine omniscience and human freedom are compatible.
A second way to argue that two propositions are consistent is by arguing
that one is necessary and the other possible. An argument along these
lines for the same conclusion about God and freedom might look like this.
Argument Two
PI. It is necessary that God exists and is essentially omniscient.
P2. It is possible that human beings are free agents.
CI. So, Divine omniscience and human freedom are compatible.
Readers of William Hasker's "No Easy Way Out: A Response to
Warfield" might think that I have somewhere defended one or both of
these arguments. Referring to my earlier article, Hasker claims (p. 362) that
arguments like Arguments One and Two are simplifications of my argument, doing "everything Warfield's original argument does, with somewhat greater economy".3
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Having confused my argument with arguments like Arguments One
and Two, Hasker goes on to point out that what I said in defense of my
argument does not provide anything like adequate support for the premises of Arguments One and Two. 4 Hasker is correct that I did not provide
adequate support for the premises of these arguments, but I was not
attempting to do so. I was attempting to provide support only for the
premises of my argument.
Here is another look at my argument. Just about everyone, including
Hasker and other critics of theological compatibilism, accepts that human
freedom is consistent with the existence of true future tensed propositions
expressing human actions. 5 So, it is a point of agreement between Hasker
and theological compatibilists that, for example, the following two propositions are consistent:
(2)
(3)

Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD.
It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD.6

Consider now the following proposition:
(1)

God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possibleworlds.

If (1) is true, then (3) is strictly equivalent to
(5)

God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore
in 2000 AD.

It follows that if (1) is true, (5) is consistent with (2). This means that there

is a (common) view of God and omniscience, a view partially expressed by
(1), on which divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible.
Nothing Hasker says has shaken my confidence in the soundness of this
simple argument, for nothing that Hasker says addresses this simple argument. Hasker says
it is clear that Warfield assumes (1) to be true. (Otherwise he couldn't
show the equivalence of (3) and (5) .... He also assumes (2) is logically
possible; otherwise it couldn't be consistent with (3). (p. 362).
This is what leads Hasker to reformulate my argument as Argument Two,
but this is a mistake.
I don't in any inappropriate way "assume" that (2) is logically possible.
That (2) is possible is a strict consequence of something Hasker and I both
accept, namely that (2) and (3) are compatible. I assume that there is nothing dialectically inappropriate in accepting a proposition implied by a
claim of my opponent. More to the heart of Hasker's criticism, the only
sense in which I assume (1) to be true is in assuming it for conditional
proof. I assume, for conditional proof, that (1) is true and show that the
consistency of (3) and (5) follows. It follows that one view of God and
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omniscience is consistent with the existence of human freedom. 7
I can do, and did, all of this without arguing for the truth of (1). I do this
in just the way that one might argue that causal determinism is incompatible with human freedom by assuming the truth of determinism and deriving a "no freedom" conclusion. One can do this, and thereby conclude that
causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible, without
defending the thesis that the actual world is deterministic. Similarly, I
maintain, one can argue that the truth of a certain view of God and omniscience is compatible with the thesis that humans are free agents without
arguing that the actual world contains both God and human freedom. I
therefore reject Hasker's alleged simplification of my argument and claim
that Hasker's criticisms are not criticisms of my argument.

III. Reply to Professor Brueckner
I fully accept the main point of Brueckner's commentary on my paper. I
fail to understand, however, why Brueckner thinks that his main point is a
criticism of my paper. The main point is that one can reject an argument as
unpersuasive without accepting that the premises of the argument are
broadly logically compatible with the negation of the argument's conclusion (p. 132). I of course agree that this is true. Brueckner claims that my
argument somehow depends on a rejection of this triviality l do not agree.
Brueckner maintains that my "strategy is to claim that in order to reject
[arguments for logical fatalism], one must hold that there is a possible
world in which [(2) and (3)] are both true" (p. 133). "But," he continues,
"that will be a world in which [given the assumption of (1)] God exists and
foreknows every human action, including Plantinga's 2000 AD ascent" (p.
133). "And so," he concludes, "it will be a world in which ... Plantinga
freely climbs" (p. 133). The world in question, then, would be a world with
both freedom and foreknowledge and so freedom and foreknowledge are,
if the argument is correct, compatible.
Brueckner criticizes the initial assumption of this argument, pointing
out that the trivial truth noted above conflicts with the claim that rejecting
arguments for fatalism requires that one accept that there is a possible
world in which both (2) and (3) are true. What Brueckner fails to provide,
however, is any evidence to support his claim that my "strategy" is what
he says it is. 8
I did not in any way endorse the "strategy" that Brueckner attributes to
me. What I did say in presenting my argument is this: "I assume that fatalism is false and not merely that the arguments for it are unpersuasive" (p.
84, note 3). I take logical fatalism to be the doctrine that true future tensed
propositions about human action are incompatible with the free performance of these actions. The falsity of this position, then, implies that free
action is compatible with true future tensed propositions describing the
actions (and does not merely imply that certain arguments for the fatalist
position are unpersuasive).
Is it in any way dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of logical fatalism in providing my argument for theological compatibilism? I
don't think it is. After all, as noted both in my earlier article and again in
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reply to Professor Hasker, I know of no participant in the foreknowledge
debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who does not accept the falsity of
logical fatalism. Relevant interlocutors therefore have no room to disagree
with this assumption.
My argument for theological compatibilism is not addressed to philosophers who do not think that logical fatalism is false. A philosopher who
takes a more cautious agnostic position on logical fatalism will not be
moved by my argument towards the theological compatibilist position. 9
No theological incompatibilist I am aware of, however, is agnostic about
the truth value of a proposition asserting the logical fatalist position.
Brueckner has, J conclude, criticized a claim that is in no way a part of
my argument for theological compatibilism. As a consequence I find nothing to disagree with in his commentary except his claim that he has shown
there to be a problem with my argument. 10

IV. Conclusion
I conclude that the commentaries of Professors Hasker and Brueckner fail to
make solid contact with the argument of my original paper. I do not maintain that my argument is immune from criticism. One might, for example,
wish to take up the issues about the use of conditional proof in this modally
charged context (as mentioned in note 7). And one might, of course, challenge the argument in some other way.l1 The challenges from Hasker and
Brueckner, however, rest upon misunderstandings of the argument. 12

The University of Notre Dame
NOTES
1. Ted A. Warfield, "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are
Compatible," NOllS 31, 1997, pp. 80-86.
2. William Hasker, "No Easy Way Out: A Response to Warfield," NOlls 32
(1998), pp. 361-363; Anthony Brueckner, "On An Attempt to Demonstrate the
Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," Faith and
Philosophy 17 (2000), pp. 132-134. Page references to these articles will be inserted parenthetically in the text.
3. For Argument One see Hasker p. 363; for Argument Two see Hasker p.
362.
4. Hasker does not argue that any premise of either argument is false. I
think that both arguments are sound but my purpose on this occasion (just like
my purpose in writing my earlier article on this topic) is not to defend the
soundness of these arguments.
5. For Hasker's acknowledgment of this consistency see chapter four his
God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). My argument is, plainly enough, directed at those philosophers who accept the falsity
of logical fatalism (see note 3 of my original paper). But is there anyone who
doesn't accept this? For further discussion of the relation between logical and
theological fatalism see Alicia Finch and Ted A. Warfield, "Fatalism: Logical
and Theological," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), pp. 233-238.
6. I use numbered propositions as they appeared in my original paper.

A REPL Y TO TWO CRITICS

259

Hasker, without comment, inserts an additional word ("freely") in brackets in
attempting to reproduce my propositions (3) and (5). Though I do not know
what the brackets are meant to express, I assume that Hasker's (3) therefore
implies but is not implied by my (3). I also do not know why Hasker would
substitute a nonequivalent proposition for my proposition in discussing my
argument. Hasker, so far as I am aware, still accepts that what I have labeled
(2) and (3) are consistent.
7. There are, to be sure, delicate issues lurking in this neighborhood about
how best to understand conditional proofs involving propositions that are
necessarily true if true at all (like (1) and all claims about consistency and
incompatibility). Hasker, however, does not raise such issues and so I will not
discuss them on this occasion.
8. Brueckner says that his presentation is a "simplification" of my argument. As with Hasker's attempted simplification of my argument, the problem with Brueckner's criticism is a consequence of the attempted simplification. Perhaps the moral of the story is that if one wants to be sure to hit one's
critical target, one should avoid attempts at simplifying what is already a short,
simple argument!
9. If there is a philosopher fitting this description, what is called for is a
discussion with him of the merits of the logical fatalist position.
10. Well, that's not quite right. There are a few other claims I disagree with
and a few that puzzle me. I'll mention one of each. One claim that I disagree
with is Brueckner's assertion that "it was not ... crucial to Warfield's reasoning
that he consider the fatalistic argument... . He could equally well have considered any other bad argument [for the conclusion that] Plantinga does not freely
climb" (p. 134). But perhaps this stunning assertion is just a consequence of the
misunderstanding explored in the text. Finally, I'm puzzled by what
Brueckner seems to think is a criticism of what I said about the relation of my
argument to causal determinism. Brueckner points out that my claim that my
argument would not help one attempting to argue for compatibilism about
freedom and causal determinism depends on causal determinism being contingent (p. 133). But this is exactly what I said in my original article (p. 85, note
13).
11. Additionally one might press, as Hasker fairly does, for a direct
response to the positive arguments for theological incompatibilism. As indicated in my earlier article, I prefer a broadly Ockhamistic response to the standard incompatibilist arguments. I hope to explore the issue fully on another
occasion.
12. I thank Tom Crisp for helpful discussion.

